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PERSONAL LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS
FOR ULTRA VIRES CONTRACTS
A director or other officer of a corporation, when contracting on its
behalf, acts as its agent and the laws of agency are generally applicable. This note presents those problems, apparently unique to corporation law, in the liability of an agent who, with authority, contracts
for a principal who has no authority.' Of no concern here are those
instances where, either because of ratification or estoppel, the corporation itself is liable, since if the principal is bound the other party has
2
no ground of complaint against the agent.
An officer of a corporation, contracting in excess of or without authority given him by his principal, may incur a personal liability when
the other party is unable to hold the corporation upon the contract.3
Ordinarily, however, unless the contract binds the officer personally,
as for example where his signature is unqualified and without indication of the agency, 4 or the principal is undisclosed during the contract
6
negotiations, 5 the agent cannot be held liable upon the contract itself.
With the notable exception of actions under NIL § 20, which holds an
unauthorized agent liable upon a note as a principal, an agent's liability is usually collateral to the contract.7 The proper action against
him would be in tort, for deceit or fraudulent misrepresentation of
authority,8 or for breach of an implied warranty of authority.9 It is no
1. Use of the word "authority" in this manner, to apply to both a director
and a corporation, is perhaps unfortunate in that the latter application should
not, correctly, imply an agent-principal relationship between the corporation
and the state. The cases have not expressed a necessity for further refinement,
however. A distinction between corporate capacity and corporate authority
has been attempted in the MODEL BusiNEss CoRPoRATxoN AcT, § 11-I, 9 U.L.A.
75 (1951). A distinction between a principal's competency and capacity is attempted in RESTATEMENT, AGENcY § 332 (1933).
2. Chieppo v. Chieppo, 88 Conn. 233, 90 AtI. 940 (1914).
3. This is true notwithstanding the agent's bona fide belief that he actually

had the authority, provided the other party had no knowledge of the want
of authority. Subsequent ratification by the corporation, however, may absolve the director of liability. Jacobs v. Williams, 85 Conn. 215, 82 Atl. 202
(1912); Grieb & Erickson, Inc. v. Estberg, 186 Wis. 174, 202 N.W. 331 (1925).
4. Baird v. Publishers' Nat. Service Bureau, 51 N.D. 374, 199 N.W. 757
(1924). Cf. Northern Trust & Savings Bank v. Ellwood, 200 Iowa 1213, 206 N.W.
256 (1925).
5. See Leinkauf v. Lombard, 137 N.Y. 417, 33 N.E. 472, 474 (1893).
6. Jacobs v. Williams, 85 Conn. 215, 82 Atl. 202 (1912); Hill v. Daniel, 52
Ga. App. 427, 183 S.E. 662 (1936); Groeltz v. Armstrong, 125 Iowa 39, 99 N.W.
128 (1904). A caveat, drawn from the cases, may be appropriate here. Many
attorneys, when drafting their complaints, draw separate but identical counts
against the corporation and the contracting director, erroneously reasoning
that if one is not liable upon the contract, the other surely must be. Such complaints, against the agent upon the contract itself, have usually been dismissed.
7. Pierson v. Holdridge, 92 Kan. 365, 140 Pac. 1032 (1914). Cf. Chieppo v.
Chieppo, 88 Conn. 233, 90 At. 940 (1914) (incomplete incorporation). See also
BRTTON, BILLS ND NOTES § 166 (1943).
8. Jacobs v. Williams, 85 Conn. 215, 82 Atl. 202 (1912).
9. Pierson v. Holdridge, 92 Kan. 365, 140 Pac. 1032 (1914); Baltzen v-

Nicolay, 53 N.Y. 467 (1873).
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defense to the director that the other party could have ascertained
the scope of his powers from the by-laws or minutes of the corporation
which are internal regulations, not of the status of the law, and not
normally open to nor binding upon the public. 10
The capacity, power, rights and authority of a corporation, expressed
in corporate charter or a statute, are matters of law,"1 and representations, express or implied, as to their existence or scope are consequently representations of matters of law. 12 Those contracting or
otherwise dealing with a corporation are affected with notice of the
authority and powers of that corporation,13 and are chargeable with
the same knowledge of those powers as is an agent, director or other
corporate officer. 14 It is upon this reasoning that the courts have uniformly refused to impose tort liability, for deceit or false representation of authority, upon directors who make contracts which are ultra
15
vires the corporation.
Some cases indicate that liability might be imposed where the
director is guilty of a willful wrong- where he is deceitful, 16 fraudu-

10. See Groeltz v. Armstrong, 125 Iowa 39, 99 N.W. 128 (1904). Also see

BALLAnTINE, CORPORATIONS § 107 (1946).

11. B. J. Wolfe & Sons v. McKeon, 2 Ala. App. 421, 57 So. 63 (1911); Parker
v. Thomas, 19 Ind. 213, 81 Am. Dec. 385 (1862); Hermitage Hotel Co. v. Dyer,
125 Tenn. 302, 142 S.W. 1117 (1911); First Nat. Bank of Cuero v. Commercial
Nat. Bank of Beeville, 99 Tex. 118, 87 S.W. 1032 (1905).
12. Parker v. Thomas, 19 Ind. 213, 81 Am. Dec. 385 (1862); Abeles v. Cochran,
22 Kan. 287, 31 Am. Rep. 194 (1879); Rashdall v. Ford, L.R. 2 Eq. 750 (1866).
13.- Holt v. Winfield Bank, 25 Fed. 812 (C.C.D. Kan. 1885); Sandford v.
McArthur, 57 Ky. 328 (1857); Merchants' & Planters' Packet Co. v. Streuby, 91
Miss. 211, 44 So. 791 (1907); Tennessee Automatic Lighting Co. v. Massey, 56
S.W. 35 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1899); cf. Newman v. Sylvester, 42 Ind. 106 (1873);
see Groeltz v. Armstrong, 125 Iowa 39, 99 N.W. 128, 129 (1904).
14. B. J. Wolfe & Sons v. McKeon, 2 Ala. App. 421, 57 So. 63 (1911) (mere
mistake of law as to capacity of principal no ground for charging agent); Abeles
v. Cochran, 22 Kan. 287, 31 Am. Rep. 194 (1879); Humphrey v. Jones, 71 Mo. 62
(1879). (innocent mistake of law); see Thilmany v. Iowa Paper-Bag Co., 108
Iowa 357, 79 N.W. 261, 262 (1899); cf. Frost Mfg. Co. v. Foster, 76 Iowa 535,
41 N.W. 212 (1889).
15. Holt v. Winfield Bank, 25 Fed. 812 (C.C.D. Kan. 1885); Ketcham v.
Mississippi Outdoor Displays, Inc., 203 Miss. 52, 33 So.2d 300 (1948); Merchants'
& Planters' Packet Co. v. Streuby, 91 Miss. 211, 44 So. 791 (1907); Humphrey
v. Jones, 71 Mo. 62 (1879) (the same rule applicable to officers of public or
municipal corporations on contracts executed on behalf of the public); Hermitage Hotel Co. v. Dyer, 125 Tenn. 302, 142 S.W. 1117 (1911); Tennessee
Automatic Lighting Co. v. Massey, 56 S.W. 35 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1899) (the
doing of ultra vires acts by a corporation does not of itself render the members

personally liable); First Nat. Bank of Cuero v. Commercial Nat. Bank of Beeville, 99 Tex. 118, 87 S.W. 1032 (1905). Cf. Sourwine v. McRoy Clay Works,
42 Ind. App. 358, 85 N.E. 782 (1908) (mutual mistake); Dietrich v. Rothenberger, 52 Ky. L. Rep. 338, 75 S.W. 271 (1903); Shoun v. Armstrong, 59 S.W.
790 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1900); Staacke v. Routledge, 111 Tex. 489, 241 S.W. 994
(1922); Eaglesfield v. Marquis of Londonberry, L.R. 4 Ch. 693 (1874). But cf.
Leinkauf v. Lombard, 137 N.Y. 417, 33 N.E. 472 (1893); Ridenour v. Mayo, 40
Ohio St. 9 (1883); Small v. Elliott, 12 S.D. 570, 82 N.W. 92 (1900); Weeks v.
Propert, L.R. 8 C.P. 427 (1873); Richardson v. Williamson & Lawson, L.R.
6 Q.B. 276 (1871).
16. Thilmany v. Iowa Paper-Bag Co., 108 Iowa 357, 79 N.W. 261 (1899);
see Sourwine v. McRoy Clay Works, 42 Ind. App. 358, 85 N.E. 782, 783 (1908);
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lently represents his authority 7 or fraudulently misleads another
knowing that the corporation could or would not perform'8 - but
there are virtually no cases which actually do impose liability upon
that ground, 19 and the proposition is relegated to the status of dicta
only. Indeed, if corporate authority is a matter of law, it would appear
to be immaterial that misrepresentations as to its scope are willful.
Moreover, since liability is not imposed for an intentional misrepresentation of corporate authority, it is not surprising that no liability
is upon the director for either negligent failure to ascertain the scope
of corporate power,2 0 or failure to disclose known limitations.21
Where the action against the director is for breach of an implied
warranty of authority, the courts generally agree that a director war-

rants his own authority, but deny that he warrants his principal's
authority to enter into the contract.2 Little attempt has been made to
differentiate corporate authority and capacity in this regard.2 3 Other
cases indicate that a director will not be liable where he makes an
unauthorized contract unless the contract is one which could have been
enforced against the principal if authorized.2 4 Others hold the agreecf. Chieppo v. Chieppo, 88 Conn. 233, 90 Atl. 940 (1914) (incomplete incorporation); Parker v. Thomas, 19 Ind. 213, 215, 81 Am. Dec. 385 (1862). But cf.
McCarty v. Love, 145 Miss. 330, 110 So. 795, 796 (1927); Hermitage Hotel Co.
v. Dyer, 125 Tenn. 302, 142 S.W. 1117 (1911).
17. Abeles v. Cochran, 22 Kan. 287, 31 Am. Rep. 194 (1879); Merchants' &
Planters' Packet Co. v. Streuby, 91 Miss. 211, 44 So. 791 (1907). The mere fact
that the contract is ultravires does not taint the transaction with fraud. Lowe
v. Kohn, 128 Conn. 45, 20 A.2d 407 (1941).
18. See Lowe v. Kohn, 128 Conn. 45, 20 A.2d 407, 410 (1941); A. Lorenze
Co. v. Wilbert, 165 La. 247, 115 So. 475, 476 (1928); McCarty v. Love, 145 Miss.
330, 110 So. 795, 796 (1927).
19. But see Holt v. Winfield Bank, 25 Fed. 812, 815 (C.C.D. Kan. 1885);
First Nat. Bank of Cuero v. Commercial Nat. Bank of Beeville, 99 Tex. 118,
87 S.W. 1032, 1035 (1905).
20. But see Brannin v. Loving, 82 Ky. 370, 374-75 (1884).
21. But see Humphrey v. Jones, 71 Mo. 62, 65 (1879).
22. Thilmany v. Iowa Paper-Bag Co., 108 Iowa 357, 79 N.W. 261 (1899)
(agent cannot be held to a warranty of legality of corporation's contracts);
Ketcham v. Mississippi Outdoor Displays, Inc., 203 Miss. 52, 33 So.2d 300 (1948);
Jenkins v. City of Henderson, 214 N.C. 244, 199 S.E. 37 (1938). But cf. Small
v. Elliott, 12 S.D. 570, 82 N.W. 92, 93 (1900), in which the court said, "[DJefendant should not escape personal liability without establishing the liability
of his principal."
23. The RESTATEMEN, AGENCY § 332 (1933) indicates that an agenl contracting for a principal without capacity is not liable to the other party,
unless he represents his principal has capacity or he knows the principal lacks
capacity. Corporate compliance with registration requirements for doing business in other than the incorporating state has been viewed as a question of
corporate capacity, however, which an agent has been held to warrant. Raff v.
Isman, 235 Pa. 347, 84 Atl. 352 (1912). See Note, 26 HARv. L. REV. 542 (1913).
Also see MODEL BusINEss CORPORATION ACT, § 11, 9 U.L.A. 75 (1951).
24. Thilmany v. Iowa Paper-Bag Co., 108 Iowa 357, 79 N.W. 261 (1899).
"Otherwise the anomaly would exist of giving a right of action against the
assumed agent for an unauthorized representation of his power to make a contract, when the breach of the contract itself, if he had been authorized to
make it, would have furnished no ground of action." Browne v. Hare, 112
W. Va. 648, 166 S.E. 362 (1932). See Baltzen v. Nicolay, 53 N.Y. 467 (1873)
(recovery for breach of warranty of authority denied; contract barred by the
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ment is illegal and there is consequently no liability on any party.2 5
There are indications in some of the cases that liability for an ultra
vires contract might be imposed upon the director in one of the following situations: where the other party is ignorant of the existence
of the corporation, upon the agency doctrine of undisclosed principal; 26
where the director is sole owner or in complete control of the corboratin;27 where the incorporation is a cloak for illegal acts;28 where the
director receives and retains money upon the ultra vires contract upon
the principle of unjust enrichment, 29 notwithstanding the contract was
ultra vires the corporation. Imposition of liability upon a director on
any of these grounds would appear to be consistent with decisions and
reasoning in related areas.
CRITIQUE

Although the rule which holds a director not liable for making an
ultra vires contract is referred to by the text writers as the better and
majority view,30 it is in reality both unfair and virtually unanimous.
Because the doctrine of ultra vires is manifestly so unfair to those
contracting with a corporation, the tendency of most courts has been
to interpret the powers and authority of a corporation broadly so as
to include many activities and thus limit the necessity for application
Statute of Frauds); Dung v. Parker, 52 N.Y. 494 (1873). But cf. Small v. Elliott,
12 S.D. 570, 82 N.W. 92 (1900).
25. See Humphrey v. Jones, 71 Mo. 62, 66 (1879); Kennedy v. Kennedy, 91
N.Y.S.2d 294 (Sup. Ct. 1949). But cf. McGrew v. City Produce Exchange, 85
Tenn. 572, 4 S.W. 38 (1887). Performance of an act prohibited by statute may
result in forfeiture of the corporate charter and criminal liability for the
director, but it does not per se subject him to civil liability. See BALLANTmE,
CoRPORATIONS § 108 (1946). This result hardly seems satisfactory.
26. See Piser v. Serota & Gans, 182 Ill. App. 390 (1913); Leinkauf v. Lombard, 137 N.Y. 417, 33 N.E. 472, 474 (1893). The contract may by its terms impose a liability upon the director as an individual. See Hill v. Daniel, 52 Ga.
App. 427, 183 S.E. 662, 663 (1936); Thilmany v. Iowa Paper-Bag Co., 108 Iowa
357, 79 N.W. 261, 262 (1899); Knickerbocker v. Wilcox, 83 Mich. 200, 47 N.W.
123,
(1890); Hermitage Hotel Co. v. Dyer, 125 Tenn. 302, 142 S.W. 1117,
1118 124
(1911).
27. Bankers Trust Co. v. Economy Coal Co., 224 Iowa 36, 276 N.W. 16 (1937).
Since the corporation cannot conduct a business prohibited by law, it may be
deemed to be the business of the officers only, and they may be liable as
partners. Mandeville v. Courtright, 142 Fed. 97 (3d Cir. 1905). Cf. Ridenour
v. Mayo, 40 Ohio St. 9 (1883).
28. McGrew v. City Produce Exchange, 85 Tenn. 572, 4 S.W. 38 (1887).
See Musso v. Rice, 44 S.W.2d 895, 897 (Mo. App. 1932); Searight, Thornton
& Co. v. Payne, 2 Tenn. Ch. 175, 180 (1874); Schorman v. McIntyre, 92 Wash.
116, 158 Pac. 993 (1916) (director cannot hide behind agency).
29. Schorman v. McIntyre, 92 Wash. 116, 158 Pac. 993 (1916); see Lehman
v. Knapp, 48 La. Ann. 1148, 20 So. 674, 677 (1896); cf. Unternahrer v. Baker,
18 Wash.2d 393, 139 P.2d 318 (1943); Richardson v. Williamson & Lawson, L.R.
6 Q.B. 276 (1871). A quasi-contract action is not enforcement but disaffirmance
of the ultra vires contract. See BAwLLTI-E, CoaRoRAToNs § 105 (1946).
30. See BALLANTxn, Cou'oRATioNs § 65 (1946); STEvENs, CoRPoRATIONs § 155
(2d ed. 1949); Notes, 48 Am. St. Rep. 916 (1895); 6 L.R.A. (N.s.) 1005 (1907);
26 HARv. L. REv. 542 (1913). Also see 1 MEcHnm, AGENCY § 1386 (2d ed. 1914);
2 Am. JmuL, Agency § 318 (1936).
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of the doctrine;3 1 but retention of the fiction of public notice of the
charter of a corporation persists and is especially unfair and unrealistic in this era of vague charter provisions and foreign corporations. To continue to consider charter provisions as matters of law,
misrepresentation of which will not afford grounds for liability, is
difficult to justify.
In cases involving a tort arising out of an ultra vires activity (that
is, collateral to, rather than upon, the ultra vires contract itself), the
courts have been especially impatient with the doctrine and in imposing liability upon the directors, notwithstanding the injured party
might have ascertained the corporate powers in advance of the injury
have held the defense of ultra vires unavailable to the participating
directors.3 2 Normally, the plea of ultra vires is available only to the
corporation itself, its stockholders and, in certain cases, the state or
sovereignty.33 There is no good reason why it should also be available
to a fraudulent director.3 4 It allows him to prove first that he was
acting for the corporation, and then to show, seemingly inconsistently,
that the corporation was without authority. Further, there should be
some application of the doctrine of estoppel (which has been apparently overlooked in this area), to prevent an officer who asserts,
expressly or impliedly, that his corporation has power to enter into a
transaction to later deny that same power.3 5 It is one thing to protect
the corporation and its stockholders for the reason that an ultra vires
contract is against the law and wrongful, and entirely different and
31. Of course the doctrine itself is under persistent attack. See BALLANTInM,
§ 1021-1028 (1947). Also see BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 106
logical and ill-founded." Proposed statutes would abolish the doctrine as to
lack of authority, at least under the purpose clause of the charter. See MODEL
BUSINEss CORPORATION ACT, §§ 10, 11, 9 U.L.A. 73, 75 (1951). Consider the
anomaly of each of two contracting directors being under a greater duty to
ascertain the authority of the other's corporation than his own.
The directors may later be liable to the corporation for unauthorized acts,
CORPORATIONS

which is, in result, similar to holding them liable directly to the other party.
See STEVENS, CORPORATIONS § 155 (2d ed. 1949). As to director's liability to
the corporation or stockholders for unauthorized acts, see 3 FLETCHER, PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS § 1021-1028 (1947). Also see BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 106
(1946). As to liability to creditors, see 3 FLETCHER, PRIVATE CoRPORATIONS § 1191
(1947). Also see BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 104 (1946).
32. "In a word, these defendants, in view of their knowledge and active participation, cannot be heard to say that what they were causing to be done,
was not being done by them but by their corporation, when that corporation
could not conduct the business and they knew that it could not." Mandeville
v. Courtright, 142 Fed. 97, 100 (3d Cir. 1905).
33. See 13 AM. JUR., Corporations§§ 759-765 (1938).
34. Where an ultra vires transaction has some relation to, but is separable
from, the contract in suit, the plea is not available. Pittsburgh, C. & St. L. Ry.
v. Keokuk & H. Bridge Co., 131 U.S. 371, 9 Sup. Ct. 770, 33 L. Ed. 157 (1889).
An action against a director in tort or warranty would also appear to be
juristically distinct from the ultra vires contract, and the plea should similarly
be not allowed.
35. See Mandeville v. Courtright, 142 Fed. 97, 100 (3d Cir. 1905). But cf.
Bankers Trust Co. v. Economy Coal Co., 224 Iowa 36, 276 N.W. 16, 19 (1937).
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inconsistent to protect the participating directors from liability for the
very same reason.
The reason an agent is held liable when he has no authority is that
the other party is deprived of a remedy upon the contract against the
principal and it is but just that the agent who contracted without
authority bear the loss. 36 This same reasoning seems equafly appropriate to an ultra vires contract. Moreover, since a director warrants
his authority, if the authority given him by a corporation is a nullity
because ultra vires, has he not breached his warranty, whatever the
37
state of the corporate power?
Precedent for holding a director liable may be found most readily
in those analogous cases which hold him liable for contracts made on
behalf of a nonexistent, incompletely incorporated, defective, dissolved
or forfeited corporation.8 Where there is no principal, a person assuming to act as officer or agent is dealt with as a principal for breach
of an implied representation that the corporation existed, and is personally liable for breach of contract or tort.39 So also, the individual
members are liable upon the contracts of an unincorporated organization, either because they held themselves out as agents of a principal
that had no existence (or was not a legal entity) or because they
themselves are principals, since none other exist.40 A similar rationale
would hold them liable where the corporation has no authority, either
because they held themselves out as agents of a principal that could
not legally perform, or because they themselves are principals, since
36. Grieb & Erickson, Inc. v. Estberg, 186 Wis. 174, 202 N.W. 331 (1925).
37. The statement of powers in a charter limits not only the corporation but

the actual authority of the directors themselves. See BALLANTINE, CORPORA-

TiONS § 82 (1946). A corporation which has ceased to exist upon forfeiture of
its charter has no authority to do anything or to authorize anyone else to do
anything for it. Black, Sivalls & Bryson, Inc. v. Connell, 149 Kan. 118, 86 P.2d
545 (1939). In Hill v. Daniel, 52 Ga. App. 427, 183 S.E. 662 (1936), an unauthorized agent made a contract for an unauthorized corporation, but since
the action against the agent was erroneously brought on the contract itself,
the court did not determine which lack of authority was controlling.
38. Lewis v. Tilton, 64 Iowa 220, 19 N.W. 911 (1884); Black, Sivalls & Bryson,
Inc. v. Connell, 149 Kan. 118, 86 P.2d 545 (1939); Studerus Oil Co. v. Bienfang,
122 N.J.L. 238, 4 A.2d 787 (Sup. Ct. 1939). See Southeastern Const. Co. v.
Robbins, 248 Ala. 367, 27 So.2d 705 (1946). But if there is a de facto.corporation, the other party cannot disregard the corporate character, nor impose a
personal liability upon a director by questioning the corporate existence.
See Note, 48 Am. St. Rep. 916 (1895).
TIoNS § 1121 (1947).

Also see 3 FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORA-

39. Claude Neon Lights, Inc. v. American Neon Light Corp., 39 F.2d 548
(2d Cir. 1930); Chieppo v. Chieppo, 88 Conn. 233, 90 Atl. 940 (1914); Seeberger
v. McCormick, 178 Ill. 404, 53 N.E. 340 (1899). One who signs a promissory
note as president of a nonexistent corporation is liable personally on the note
itself. Black, Sivalls & Bryson, Inc. v. Connell, 149 Kan. 118, 86 P.2d 545
(1939).

See NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAw § 20.

40. Lewis v. Tilton, 64 Iowa 220, 19 N.W. 911 (1884) (club had no legal
existence and could not sue or be sued); Blakely v. Bennecke, 59 Mo. 193
(1875) (liability not that of an agent but personal); Woodward v. Beasley, 2
Tenn. Ch. App. 339 (1902); cf. Small v. Elliott, 12. S.D. 570, 82 N.W. 92 (1900)
(director must show corporation's power).
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none other exist who could legally perform the contract. Upon identical grounds directors have been held individually liable when continuing the business of a corporation which has been dissolved or
whose franchise has been forfeited. 41 Misrepresentations as to the
existence, dissolution or forfeiture of a corporate charter are viewed
as misrepresentations of fact, permitting recovery. 42 Why should a
third party more easily discover the scope of the powers in a charter
than the existence of the corporation itself? If what is in the charter
is a matter of law, the very existence of the charter itself should be a
matter of law also. That the courts do not consider it to be so testifies
to the unfairness of that view.
Of course, cases involving ultra vires contracts are becoming less
frequent than before for the reason that courts more readily hold the
corporations themselves liable on many ultra vires contracts, 43 but it
is still unreasonable to protect directors, who are so very close to a
corporation and should be charged with complete knowledge of corporate powers, at the expense of the public. Ultra vires contracts
should be made at the directors' peril, not at the public's. At least one
case recognized the need for a statute imposing liability on the directors. 44 The paucity of recent cases should not completely preclude the
introduction of statutes imposing liability, since the rule itself discourages many potential wronged suitors.
J. F. DiRisio
41. Studerus Oil Co. v. Bienfang, 122 N.J.L. 238, 4 A.2d 787 (Sup. Ct. 1939)
(notwithstanding good faith). In Tennessee Automatic Lighting Co. v. Massey,
56 S.W. 35 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1899), the plaintiff attempted a collateral attack
on the charter, endeavoring to show that if there was no corporation, the contract could not be the corporation's.
42. Cf. Chieppo v. Chieppo, 88 Conn. 233, 90 Atl. 940 (1914).
43. See BALLANTnm, CoRPoRATioNs § 101 (1946); STEvEms, CoRPoIoATIONS § 76
(2d ed. 1949).
44. See Sandford v. McArthur, 57 Ky. 328 (1857); cf. Frost MIfg. Co. v. Foster,
76 Iowa 535, 41 N.W.212 (1889).

